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I.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, artists, entrepreneurs, and nonprofits (collectively
“promoters”) have tapped the collaborative power of the online crowds to fund a
wide range of charities, creative projects, and even investment opportunities. This
phenomenon is called “crowdfunding,” or sometimes “crowd financing” or “crowdsourced capital.”1 This Article first examines the intractable conflict between
investment crowdfunding and traditional U.S. securities laws and then explores
possible solutions that would enable small companies to more easily raise capital
through the online crowds.
Many promoters have embraced crowdfunding because obtaining alternate
forms of financing from traditional lenders is often difficult or impossible.2 On
* J.D., Brigham Young University, J. Reuben Clark Law School.
1

Micro-financing & Crowd funding (continued), NAT’L PERFORMING ARTS CONVENTION. (Aug. 21, 2011),
http://www.performingartsconvention.org/technology/id=478. There is a difference between “ex
post facto crowdfunding,” for which “financial support is offered in exchange for a completed
product” and “ex ante crowdfunding,” which involves “financial support . . . on the front end to assist
in achieving a mutually desired result.” Tim Kappel, Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording Industry: A
Model for the U.S.?, 29 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 375, 375 (2009). This is an important distinction, but
most crowdfunding is “ex ante.” Gijsbert Koren, Review – Ex Ante Crowdfunding and the Recording
Industry: A Model for the U.S.?, SMARTER MONEY, http://www.smartermoney.nl/?p=209 (“At virtually
all crowdfunding platforms out there, ex ante crowdfunding is the status quo.”). Since this Article
focuses only on “ex ante crowdfunding,” it usually omits the phrase “ex ante” to reduce unnecessary
verbiage.
2

See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Relaxing the Ban: It’s Time to Allow General Solicitation and Advertising in
Exempt Offerings, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004); David Lavinsky, Funding fathers, SMART BUSINESS
(Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.sbnonline.com/Local/Article/20471/65/0/Funding_fathers.aspx
(“[T]he vast majority of entrepreneurs have failed to raise venture capital. There are two key reasons
for this. First, most entrepreneurs don’t qualify for venture capital since they can’t scale fast enough,
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crowdfunding platforms, promoters are usually given the chance to pitch their ideas
to potential funders, who then choose which projects to support.3 In exchange for a
contribution, most current crowdfunding sites only allow promoters to reward
funders with nominal perks or “thank-you” gifts.4 Because the contributions are
effectively donations, this is called “patronage crowdfunding.”5
If promoters reward funders with something more than a thank-you gift,
such as an equity share in the project itself, it is “investment crowdfunding.”6 The
principal reason most promoters do not reward their online patrons with equity
shares, or any other security, is the danger of getting entangled in complicated
securities laws.7 While the United States is “[b]y far the biggest and most
sophisticated country supporting [various forms of financial investment] . . . [f]ederal
law seems to rule out . . . online marketing for investment in return for debt or
equity.”8 For instance, it is illegal in the United States to offer or sell a “security”
without either complying with arduous registration requirements or wading through
the difficult process of obtaining an exemption.9 Promoters legitimately worry that
any investment opportunity in their project could be a security known as an

nor do they have the potential for a large enough exit. And second, there are too few venture
capitalists versus the masses of entrepreneurs who need money.”).
3

Barbara Ortutay, Raising funds? Many turn to the Web for help, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Sept. 21, 2010,
at B1, available at 2010 WLNR 18760546.
4

Kappel, supra note 1, at 376 (“In return, financial contributors typically receive ‘patronage perks’
such as use of their name in the film credits or album liner notes, advanced autographed copies of the
work, or backstage access at a performer’s show.”).
5

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 376.

6

This Article adopts “investment crowdfunding,” as opposed to “equity crowdfunding,” because
funders might get a debt-based security, or funders might not get actual equity but merely an
investment contract—e.g., Grow VC, discussed later, gives subscribers a cut of the profits, but not
equity per se.
7

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 376-77; C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws,
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 4-5), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1916184.

8

Fellow Crowdfunders – What’s Holding You Up?, CROWDFUNDING CENTRAL (May 30, 2010),
http://www.crowdfundingcentral.com/blog_holdup.

9

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c, 77e(c), 77f (2006).
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“investment contract.”10 Being subject to securities requirements may spell the end
of a small enterprise because the costs of registration, or even obtaining the
exemption from registration, may exceed the total capital needed for the project.11
This Article is one of the first to examine the conflict between investment
crowdfunding and U.S. securities laws and to consider the circumstances under
which these laws might be changed to permit this new form of grassroots
investment. While it is clear that patronage crowdfunding is not subject to securities
regulation, most investment crowdfunding schemes are investment contract securities,
which are subject to federal and state securities laws.12 Furthermore, standard
exemptions from federal registration requirements are inadequate or inappropriate
for most types of investment crowdfunding.13
Given these problems, it is worthwhile to consider the merits of the current
proposal for a Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) rulemaking to create a
crowdfunding exemption. The current proposal disregards many of the fundamental
principles of the modern securities framework, and this Article explores other
possible proposals and considers the ultimate viability of SEC action altogether.
While SEC Chairman Mary Shapiro promised Congressman Darrell Issa that the
SEC would consider a crowdfunding exemption,14 it is by no means clear that the
SEC has the time, resources, or desire to draft what is sure to be a complicated
exemption and to see it through the long rulemaking process. Ultimately, legislating
a crowdfunding exemption may be easier than obtaining an exemption through the
rulemaking process.
Part II of this Article explains the origins of crowdfunding and some of the
various models that have been implemented thus far. Part III.A analyzes various
crowdfunding models to determine if they are governed by U.S. securities laws.
Assuming that U.S. securities laws apply, Part III.B analyzes the feasibility of
10

See infra p. 80.

11

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 384.

12

See Letter from Mary L. Shapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission, to The
Honorable Darrell E. Issa, Chairman, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, United
States House of Representatives (Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/schapiroissa-letter-040611.pdf [hereinafter Shapiro Letter].

13

Id. at 23.

14

See generally id.
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obtaining one of the current exemptions from full registration. Since available
exemptions may not be feasible in these circumstances, Part III.C analyzes and
critiques a current proposal for a new crowdfunding exemption, provides a balanced
proposal for such an exemption, and considers the probability of SEC action on
such an exemption. Part IV provides concluding remarks.
II.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

Crowdfunding is a burgeoning form of online fund-raising poised to
revolutionize the way that artists, entrepreneurs, and nonprofits raise money.15 It
leverages the power of social networking by allowing promoters of all kinds to raise
money by pitching ideas to a vast online crowd of potential funders.16 This Part
defines crowdfunding, describes its origins and purposes, introduces readers to
“patronage crowdfunding” and “investment crowdfunding,” and explores the
modern U.S. securities regime.
A. Definition of Crowdfunding
Like many neologisms of the Internet Age, the definition of “crowdfunding”
is a work in progress. The term is sometimes used broadly to describe almost any
form of grassroots online fundraising.17 However, for purposes of this Article,
“crowdfunding” is a process where entrepreneurs, artists, and nonprofits raise
money for their projects, businesses, or organizations by gaining the support of
many people on the internet who collectively contribute money to projects to which
they feel some affinity.18 Unlike other forms of online fundraising, crowdfunding
involves a many-to-one relationship between funders and recipients.19
15

See Kappel, supra note 1 at 376; Jouko Ahvenainen, Crowd-funding for startups: Idea behind this emerging
model is to fix the current inefficiencies of private seed funding for firms, BUS. TIMES, May 3, 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 9097842; Bradford, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that “[b]illions of dollars have been raised
through crowdfunding, possibly the beginning of a revolution in how we allocate capital.”)
16

See Ortutay, supra note 3, at B1.

17

Lavinsky, supra note 2 (“Crowdfunding is when a group of people collectively fund a cause. That
cause could range from paying for medical bills or a wedding to filming a movie or starting or growing
a business. To an extent, crowdfunding has been around forever and is the basis for most nonprofit
fundraisers.”).
18

See Bradford, supra note 7, at 4; Alysha Schertz, Crowd funding helps businesses raise capital,
BIZTIMES.COM (Apr. 2, 2010), http://www.biztimes.com/news/2010/4/2/crowd-funding-helpsbusinesses-raise-capital (“Crowd funding is a strategic way for entrepreneurs, artists and nonprofits to
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Under this definition, crowdfunding is distinguishable from “microfinance”
or “peer-to-peer lending.”20 While there are various forms of microfinance, one
example is making financial services available to the impoverished21usually in
developing nationswho do not have access to traditional lending institutions.22
Besides microfinance, a “peer-to-peer lending” website intermediary like
Prosper.com provides online users the opportunity to lend to, or borrow from, other
users of the site.23 While the amounts are usually much larger than with
microfinancing, peer-to-peer lending usually involves a one-to-one relationship
between funder and recipient, rather than the many-to-one relationship in
crowdfunding.24 Furthermore, while these transactions are structured like loans,
most patronage crowdfunding transactions are structured as voluntary
contributions.25

raise money for their projects, business or organizations by gaining the support of a ‘crowd,’ or a large
group of people, to give them money.”). Crowdfunding is not motivated by charitable intent; instead,
it is a means of supporting people who are doing interesting things. See Claire Prentice, Cash-strapped
entrepreneurs get creative, BBC NEWS (May 12, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10100885 (“The
incentive for backers is both altruistic and actual. ‘Everyone must offer a system of rewards,’ says
Kickstarter co-founder Perry Chen. ‘It’s not about philanthropy or charity. It’s about patronage and
commerce.’”).
19

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 375.

20

Gijsbert Koren, Crowdfunding, microfinance and peer to peer lending, SMARTER MONEY (June 19, 2010),
http://www.smartermoney.nl/?p=73 (last visited Oct. 7, 2011) (“Crowdfunding is about a crowd of
people pooling money together, while microfinance and peer to peer lending don’t necessarily require
a crowd of small funders.”). However, some articles disagree. See, e.g., Clint Schaff, Kiva.org:
Crowdfunding the Developing World, URBANMINISTRY.ORG, http://www.urbanministry.org/wiki/kivaorgcrowdfunding-developing-world (last visited Aug. 28, 2011) (“Match microfinancing with
crowdsourcing, and you have crowdfunding.”).
21

See Anusha Subramanium & Rajiv Bhuva, Angels in the crowd: Start-ups now have a simpler route to tap
funding for the early stages than venture capital, BUSINESS TODAY (India), Aug. 22, 2010, at 75, available at
2010 WLNR 16355235. (“Kiva does provide loans to entrepreneurs by partnering with microfinance
institutions, but its larger objective is poverty alleviation.”).
22

Id.; Schaff, supra note 20.

23

See Id.

24

See Id.

25

Tom Harnish, Cloud Funding Offers More than Pennies from Heaven, CROWD SOURCE CAPITAL (Aug. 7,
2010), http://crowdsourcecapital.blogspot.com/2010/08/cloud-funding-offers-more-than-
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“Crowdfunding” usually implies the presence of an intermediary, who serves
as a matchmaker between promoters and funders.26 An intermediary, however, is
not essential to the definition. Instead, the key is the many-to-one relationship
between funders and a promoter.27 The reality is that intermediated crowdfunding is
simply more practical for most promoters.28 Some larger promoters, like Wikipedia,
already have a built-in audience they can tap for funding.29 Wikipedia regularly asks
visitors to contribute money for the upkeep of the site itself.30 Most small promoters,
however, do not have such an audience, and thus seek the help of an intermediary
that can draw a crowd together.31 As discussed below, these intermediaries often
work in different ways—some merely provide a platform for promoters to pitch
their ideas to the crowd, while some newer platforms might even allow the crowd to
invest in the intermediary itself.

pennies.html (“Unlike peer-to-peer microlending, which was introduced to the U.S. in 2005 by Kiva,
social funds [i.e., crowdfunding contributions] aren’t paid back.”).
26

See Mark Glaser, Can Crowdfunding Help Save the Journalism Business?, PBS (Nov. 13, 2008),
http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2008/11/can-crowdfunding-help-save-the-journalismbusiness318.html (Intermediaries act as “hub[s], connect[ing promoters] . . . with potential funders.”).

27

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 375-76.

28

Ortutay, supra note 3, at B1 (“Though the [crowdfunding] sites are reminiscent of single-project
online tip jars that popped up earlier in the decade, they work better because they create persistent
communities behind the projects.”).
29

Putting your money where your mouse is, ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2010, at 69, available at 2010 WLNR
17519138. (“There have of course been ‘tip jars’ on web pages for years, and even big sites like
Wikipedia ask for donations.”). Some crowdfunding advocates reject the idea that this type of
fundraising is “crowdfunding.” Id. (“‘[Crowdfunding is] not a tip jar, and that’s what makes it
sustainable,’ says Perry Chen, the boss of Kickstarter, the largest of several start-ups that act as
matchmakers between donors and projects.”). But see A Brief History of Crowdfunding, ULULE,
http://blog.ulule.com/post/700805254/a-brief-history-of-crowdfunding (last visited Aug. 27, 2011)
(“Beyond artistic projects, crowdfunding also makes it possible for modern-day patrons to help fund a
service. That’s what happened with Wikipedia, which has been covering its costs with the help of
donors since 2003.”). In any case, the sustainability of direct crowdfunding should not necessarily
determine what is or is not “crowdfunding.”
30
31

See id.

See Glaser, supra note 26 (Glaser points out that a writer “might have a gift for words but not
business.”).
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B. Origins and Purpose of Crowdfunding
Now that we have a working definition, we can explore the origins and
purpose of this new phenomenon. Crowdfunding originates from “crowd sourcing,”
which is “the idea that a [single] task can be delegated to a crowd.”32 Author Jeff
Howe, who coined the term “crowdsourcing,”33 recognized that just as many
companies had “outsourced” work to other countries, many organizations could
now “crowd source” any number of tasks to internet users around the world.34 He
observed that “[f]or the last decade or so, companies have been looking overseas, to
India or China, for cheap labor. But now it doesn’t matter where the laborers are –
they might be down the block, they might be in Indonesia – as long as they are
connected to the network.”35 Instead of primarily manual labor, these new online
laborers accomplish a range of creative tasks—from solving complex scientific
research and development problems to creating a new logo for a company.36
Like crowd sourcing, crowdfunding is a way to use the online masses to
supplement or improve existing brick-and-mortar business methods.37 Instead of
hiring permanent employees to solve creative problems, crowd sourcing might be
32

Crowdfunding, GAEBLER.COM, http://www.gaebler.com/What-Is-Crowdfunding.htm (last visited
Sept. 12, 2011).

33

David Whitford, Hired Guns on the Cheap, FORTUNE SMALL BUSINESS, Jan. 3, 2008, at 54-56, available
at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fsb/fsb_archive/2007/03/01/8402019/index.htm.

34

Jeff Howe, The Rise of Crowdsourcing, WIRED (June 2006), http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/
14.06/crowds_pr.html.
35

Id.

36

Sarah Kershaw, A Different Way to Pay for the News You Want, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at WK4,
available at 2008 WLNR 15991034 (“This financing model takes its name from crowdsourcing, a
method for using the public, typically via the Internet, to supply what employees and experts once did:
information, research and development, T-shirt designs, stock photos, advertising spots. In
crowdsourcing, the people supply the content; in crowdfunding, they supply the cash.”); Victoria
Schlesinger, Seeking to Help Budding Researchers With a Click of the Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2010, at
A19, available at 2010 WLNR 6872885.

37

See Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74 (Jacob Mathew, Managing Director of MAPE
Advisory Group, a Mumbai-based investment banking outfit, “points out that the social networking
[funding] model works well for early-stage funding, which is an unviable area for an investment
bank.”).
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more economically efficient for businesses, organizations, and others to keep their
costs down without necessarily sacrificing quality work product.38 Instead of
struggling to convince brick-and-mortar financial services companies to lend
insignificant amounts of capital, now entrepreneurs, artists, and nonprofits can turn
to the online masses for funding.39 This is important because many of these
promoters—for various reasons—would not be able to obtain a loan from a
traditional lending institution.40 First, many of these loans would be too small to be
worth the attention of a large institution.41 Second, many of these promoters have
little or no track record.42 Third, many of these projects are too risky, unpredictable,
or just plain bizarre.43 Finally, even if traditional lenders were more interested in
these projects, there are not enough of them to satisfy the demand for funding.44
Michael Sullivan apparently coined the term “crowdfunding” in 2006, but the
phenomenon had, by that time, already existed in some form for perhaps a decade or
38

Howe, supra note 34 (“[S]mart companies in industries as disparate as pharmaceuticals and
television discover ways to tap the latent talent of the crowd. The labor isn’t always free, but it costs a
lot less than paying traditional employees.”).
39

Crowdfunding, supra note 32 (“Traditional banks can’t handle microfinancing because their overhead
required to underwrite a loan precludes those loans from being too small. The same is true of many
other financial service offerings. No bank is going to spend the time to underwrite a $50 loan and
chase after small bank accounts that might never have more than $100. They just are not built for
that. . . . Similarly, crowdfunding is circumventing traditional funding mechanisms like bank loans or
venture capital.”).

40

Ahvenainen, supra note 15 (“One of the most difficult bottlenecks of a startup’s life is the early
phase funding.”).
41

Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74; Crowdfunding, supra note 32 (“No bank is going to
spend the time to underwrite a $50 loan and chase after small bank accounts that might never have
more than $100. They just are not built for that.”).

42

Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 5 (“For emerging companies, however, debt is generally not an option—
they do not have the necessary collateral, operating history, or proven track record to qualify for bank
loans.”).
43

See Life Sized Mouse trap - And 3 Other Weird Crowdfunding Projects, ARTICLESBASE.COM (Aug. 18,
2010),
http://www.articlesbase.com/business-articles/life-sized-mouse-trap-and-3-other-weirdcrowdfunding-projects-3074017.html (“Jerry Paffendorf started his crowdfunded real estate project
called ‘Loveland’ and over the course of about a dozen projects raised $11,833.00! The way this
crowdfunding project worked was hilarious, you could buy ‘inches’ of property in Detroit, MI through
‘Loveland’ and actually go visit the spot you bought and set it up the way you want!”).
44

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 3; Lavinsky, supra note 2.
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more.45 Its conceptual origins are in charitable giving.46 By the 1990s, however, some
musicians and filmmakers raised money through online funders.47 For example, the
British rock band Marillion financed their 1997 U.S. tour and several subsequent
albums through online fundraising by their fans.48 Despite these early examples of
promoters directly tapping their own audiences for funding, crowdfunding has only
recently gained prominence with the emergence of large crowdfunding
intermediaries.49 IndieGoGo, Kickstarter, and RocketHub are three popular
crowdfunding intermediaries,50 none of which existed before 2008.51
C. Instances of Different Crowdfunding Models
There are now many crowdfunding websites in existence, most of which
follow the patronage model.52 However, some investment crowdfunding sites are
coming into the market.

45

Mike Drummond, Make It Rain: Seeking Seed Money from the Crowd, INVENTORS DIGEST, Aug. 2011,
available at http://www.inventorsdigest.com/archives/7037.
46

A Brief History of Crowdfunding, supra note 29 (“The basic idea is not new – humanitarian
organizations have been doing it for decades.”).

47

See Anoraknophobia Pre-Order Press Release, Music Industry First as Marillion Fans Finance New
Album, MARILLION ONLINE (Sept. 2000), http://www.marillion.com/press/anorak.htm.

48

Id.

49

See Matt Villano, Small Donations In Large Numbers, With Online Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2010, at
F31, available at 2010 WLNR 5630437; Glaser, supra note 26; Fulfill Your Dreams Through Crowdfunding,
MY INTERNET BUSINESS REVIEW (May 24, 2010), http://myinternetbusinessreview.org/55/fulfillyour-dreams-through-crowdfunding (“There have been crowdfunding sites online since 2004, and
only now is the process really catching on.”).

50

See Philip Boroff, Fringe Festival Impresarios Find Angels Online With RocketHub, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19,
2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/fringe-festival-impresarios-find-angels-onlinevia-rockethub-kickstarter.html; Nick Mendoza, How Filmmakers Use Crowdfunding to Kickstart Productions,
PBS (Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2010/09/how-filmmakers-use-crowdfundingto-kickstart-productions264.html.

51

Kickstarter was founded in April 2009. Villano, supra note 49. IndieGoGo started in 2008. Gennefer
Snowfield, IndieGoGo: Cause Awareness Through Entertainment, TRIPLEPUNDIT (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.triplepundit.com/2009/08/indiegogo-cause-awareness-through-entertainment.
RocketHub launched in January 2010. Boroff, supra note 50.
52

See Villano, supra note 49.
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Patronage Crowdfunding

As mentioned above, most crowdfunding websites operate on a patronage
model, under which promoters can only reward funders with small thank-you gifts.
One of the most popular sites under this model is Kickstarter, which focuses on
providing a platform for a variety of creative endeavors.53 Like other crowdfunding
sites, Kickstarter imposes certain limitations. For instance, promoters can raise
money only for specific and finite projects (i.e., no rent or payroll) and may not
include charity projects or causes.54 Under this model, Kickstarter and other major
crowdfunding sites specialize in helping promoters fund creative projects like
albums, films, and novels.55
Once a crowdfunding intermediary, such as Kickstarter, accepts a project and
the promoter has set the fundraising goal, the crowdfunding intermediary allows the
promoter to appeal to potential funders.56 In making this appeal, the promoter
typically advertises the rewards available to funders who contribute a particular
amount of money. For example, a musician might give a funder a signed copy of the
funded album for a thirty dollar contribution, or play a house-show for several
hundred dollars.57

53

See id.

54

Project Guidelines, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com/help/guidelines?at=
ccc1055ad6bf3dce (last visited Sept. 14, 2011). But see Lavinsky, supra note 2 (“[Crowdfunding] could
range from paying for medical bills or a wedding to filming a movie or starting or growing a
business.”).
55

While most patronage crowdfunding sites just focus on funding, at least one, FashionStake, also
helps market and sell the final products. Lauren Indvik, FashionStake Shifts Fashion Industry Power to the
Consumer, MASHABLE (Sept. 1, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 17398672 (“FashionStake is among the
growing number of crowdfunding networks like Kickstarter, which helps aspiring creatives fund small
scale projects (typically in the $500 to $20,000 range) by offering different rewards for varying degrees
of support. The difference between FashionStake and Kickstarter is that it actually markets and sells
the goods online, rather than just providing a platform to raise funding.”).
56

See Randall Stross, You, Too, Can Bankroll a Rock Band, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2010, at BU4, available at
2010 WLNR 6962096.

57 Id. (“Groups that offer to give a concert at the place of a supporter’s choosing request an average of
$600. A custom-written song goes for about $500; a signed, vinyl LP edition of a CD, $53. Fans ‘are
not buying music, they’re buying a personalized experience,’ said Yancey Strickler, a Kickstarter cofounder.”).
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Funders who wish to support a given project pledge the money via their
credit card, after which the money might be held in an escrow account until the
project meets its funding goal.58 Kickstarter requires a given project to meet its
fundraising goal within ninety days to release the escrowed funds.59 When a project
is successfully funded, Kickstarter takes a small percentage of total money raised,
plus an amount to cover transactional costs.60 In contrast to Kickstarter’s all-ornothing approach, other sites, like IndieGoGo, transfer contributions directly to the
promoter as soon as they come in, regardless of whether the funding goal has been
met.61
Kickstarter raised over fifteen million dollars for 1,600 projects62 by July
2010.63 However, not all crowdfunding sites have been as successful. For example,
15,000 bands have attempted to raise money on SellaBand, a crowdfunding site
based in Amsterdam that focuses on providing fans with a chance to finance music
projects.64 Although three million dollars were raised for these 15,000 projects, less
58

Id. (“Friends and fans make pledges with a credit card tied to the Amazon Payments system. But it’s
a conditional pledge: the cards are charged only if there are enough pledges to meet the fund-raising
goal in 90 days.”).
59

Id.

60

See Putting Your Money Where Your Mouse Is, supra note 29.

61

Frequently Asked Questions, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/about/faqs (last visited Sept.
19, 2011) (“If you don't meet your funding goal, you still keep the money you raise with your
campaign. You will be charged a 9% fee on the money you raise, despite the unmet funding goal.”);
Harnish, supra note 25 (“Surprisingly, if you don’t reach your goal, you still keep the money you raise,
less the websites’ take. Even more surprisingly, according to Danae Ringelmann, President and cofounder of IndieGoGo, contributors understand they won’t get their money back if the project isn’t
fully funded.”). One concern is preventing people from “dishonestly claim[ing] they have a project so
they can to run off with the money[.]” Id. However, funders usually consider a variety of reputational
factors. Id. (“‘[P]rojects that don’t reveal who’s behind them, don’t have a core community, and don’t
do outreach to showcase the community building around it are very poor candidates for success. A
person who wanted to commit fraud by raising money and running would have to be willing to
destroy their reputation and social graph connections across the web to succeed.’”).

62

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouse Is, supra note 29. Ortutay, supra note 3, at B1 (“About 2,500
projects have been funded by about 200,000 people through Kickstarter since the site launched in
April 2009. About the same number have failed to meet their funding goals.”).

63

Ortutay, supra note 3, at B1. Sometimes the statistics cited do not seem to match up. Compare id.
(2,500 total projects) with Mendoza, supra note 50 (2,500 film projects total).

64

Stross, supra note 56, at BU4.
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than 50 were funded as of September 2010.65 Moreover, although SellaBand took a
large percentage of all money raised,66 it was not enough to prevent the site from
filing for bankruptcy protection in February 2006, four years after starting.67 It
remains to be seen whether patronage crowdfunding will gain enough traction
among promoters and funders to keep other sites in business.68
2.

Investment Crowdfunding

While patronage crowdfunding has been online for a decade or more,
investment crowdfunding is a more recent phenomenon.69 In this short time period,
however, two types of investment crowdfunding have emerged: patronage-plus and
pure investment crowdfunding.70 Patronage-plus crowdfunding is best understood
through the use of an example. For instance, the website Bandstocks allows
residents in the UK to contribute money to help bands produce new albums.71 Like
with patronage crowdfunding, Bandstocks funders receive certain in-kind perks, such
as a copy of the recording or VIP privileges.72 Unlike patronage crowdfunding,

65

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouse Is , supra note 29; Stross, supra note 56, at BU4.

66

Stross, supra note 56, at BU4.

67

Eliot Van Buskirk, Bankrupt, Crowd-Funded SellaBand Acquired by German Investors, WIRED (Feb. 24,
2010), http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2010/02/bankrupt-crowd-funded-sellaband-acquired-bygerman-investors/.

68

Putting Your Money Where Your Mouse Is , supra note 29 (“Crowdfunding may turn out to be a fad, says
Cory Doctorow, a bestselling novelist and blogger who is experimenting with various forms of
micropatronage, including selling a bespoke short story for $10,000 to one of his fans. ‘There will be
some people for whom the fact that they raise money for themselves will be a marketing story,’ he
says. But crowdfunding’s early success at raising sums large enough to be useful, though not large
enough to replace other sources of funding for creative works, fits in with a broader trend of using
technology to bring artists and their audiences closer together.”).

69

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 379.

70

See id. at 376; see also Ahvenainen, supra note 15.

71

Kappel, supra note 1, at 380; Rob Hastings, Rock ‘n’ Roll Returns, FORBES (Aug. 29, 2008),
http://www.forbes.com/2008/08/29/bands-investing-rock-face-cx_rh_0829autofacescan02.html

72

Kappel, supra note 1, at 380.
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however, Bandstocks’ funders acquire a financial interest in the recording.73 In other
words, they are entitled to a share of the net receipts generated by the album.74
In pure investment crowdfunding funders are rewarded with a financial
interest only.75 Pure investment crowdfunding may be the next logical step for
crowdfunding because many promoters need more money than they could raise
using a pure patronage model.76 Securities laws, however, are a formidable barrier to
investment crowdfunding in the United States77 as so much of this activity occurs
abroad.
Hong-Kong based Grow VC, launched in February 2010, is one of the first
pure investment crowdfunding platforms.78 To participate, potential Grow VC
funders must register and pay a subscription fee—between $25 and $140 a month,
depending on how much equity that member wants.79 As of August 2010, Grow VC
had over three thousand registered members.80 Grow VC takes 25% of the
subscription fees upfront to cover administrative costs; the rest is pooled together in
a community investment fund.81 Subscribers have the power to allocate a portion of
the community investment fund to particular entrepreneurial projects that they think
have the most potential for return.82 Once a project meets its funding goal, “Grow
73

Id. at 381.

74

Id.

75

See Frequently Asked Questions, GROWVC, http://growvc.com/help (last visited Sept. 20, 2011).

76

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 376 (“Some view patronage-plus ex ante crowdfunding models as more
sustainable than those based on pure patronage because fans become literally invested in the success
of their artists.”).
77

See id. at 376, 383-84 (“Whatever promise patronage-plus ex ante crowdfunding models hold,
without a presence in the U.S. market, their prospects for growth are severely limited. . . . Compared
to many foreign jurisdictions, SEC registration is typically more burdensome and expensive.”).
78 Ahvenainen, supra note 15; K. Giriprakash, Come Here to Fund a Promising Idea, BUSINESS LINE
(Hindu), Aug. 4, 2010, at 9, available at 2010 WLNR 15425105; Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21,
at 73.
79

Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74.

80 Id. at 73; see also Prentice, supra note 18 (“Some 25% of Grow VC users are in the US, 11% in the
UK and 7% in India.”).
81

Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74.

82

Id.
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VC along with its Indian partner, Springboard Ventures, carry out their own
evaluation of the start-up and if they are satisfied, hand hold the venture for another
three years or more before exiting the venture.”83
Upon exit, Grow VC takes another 25% of any profits from the project,
recouping some of its costs during the incubation period.84 Those members who
invested their portion of the fund into a successful project receive a certain
percentage of the profits.85 The members who invested first in the successful project
are rewarded more handsomely than those who invested just before the project met
its fundraising goal.86 Thus, Grow VC’s model encourages members to become
adept at picking projects that will ultimately prove to be profitable.
The Grow VC model has changed the traditional Venture Capital (“VC”)
and Private Equity (“PE”) model—traditional VC/PE firms usually take a small
share of a large investment, but Grow VC takes a large share of a small investment.87
Grow VC is tapping into a market that has largely been ignored by traditional VC
firms.88 Traditional VC firms look for companies that have the potential for rapid
growth culminating in an initial public offering (“IPO”).89 Grow VC and its
subscribers, on the other hand, are more interested in start-up companies that are
still quite small.90 As a result, Grow VC focuses on fledgling companies,91 helping
them grow to the size where larger VC firms can take them all the way to an IPO.92

83

Giriprakash, supra note 78, at 9.

84

See Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74.

85

See Id.

86

See Id.

87

See Id.

88

Ahvenainen, supra note 15 (“The traditional VC model is not enough anymore; we need a more
effective, transparent and global market for startup funding.”).

89

See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-00-190, REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN,
COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS, U.S. SENATE, SMALL BUSINESS EFFORTS TO FACILITATE, EQUITY
CAPITAL FORMATION, at 10 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/gg00190.pdf.
90

Ahvenainen, supra note 15; see Prentice, supra note 18 (“Petra Soderling heard about Grow VC on
Twitter and is making the minimum Grow VC investment of $20 a month. ‘For me it’s about
investing and hoping to see a profit but also about using a small amount of money to help small
companies,’ she says.”).
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Another pure investment crowdfunding operation is ProFounder, which
functions as a matchmaker between promoters seeking capital in the United States
and those who have a “substantial, pre-existing relationship” with a given
promoter.93 Thus, the “crowd” is comprised of friends and family.94 ProFounder
describes itself as a “community-based crowdfunding platform,” as opposed to the
normal crowdfunding platform where promoters appeal to the masses without the
need for a preexisting relationship.95 These restrictions provide the environment for
“private placement offerings,” which are exempt from full federal registration of the
securities under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act of 1933.96 Once family and friends
are verified, they may access the promoter’s promotional webpage and even make
investments on the site.97 ProFounder then facilitates many of the formalities, most
importantly helping entrepreneurs comply with state registration laws based on the
location of each investor.98
Besides these two examples, many different variations on the pure
crowdfunding investment model are possible. For example, there could be
variations on the VC model; instead of offering a monthly subscription, new sites
might offer funders freely tradable shares in the intermediary itself. Likewise, new
crowdfunding sites might offer a micro-cap mutual fund with redeemable shares in
diversified and non-diversified portfolios selected by members of the fund. Finally,

91

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 5 (“There are four recognized broad categories of equity financing that
a typical emerging company requires as it grows and matures: seed financing, start-up financing, earlystage financing, and later-stage financing.”).
92

See Greg Ferenstein, HOW TO: Crowdsource Funds for Causes, Creativity and Startups, MASHABLE (Jun.
21, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 12557746 (“‘The community fund acts as an “activator” for bigger
investments . . . .’”); see Prentice, supra note 18.

93

David Lang, The Myth of the Crowd, PROFOUNDER (June 21, 2011), http://blog.profounder.com/
2011/06/21/the-myth-of-the-crowd/.
94

Id.

95

Id. (emphasis added).

96

15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006); see infra Part III.B.2.

97

Leena Rao, Crowdsourced Fundraising Platform ProFounder Now Offers Equity-Based Investment Tools,
TECHCRUNCH (May 3, 2011), http://techcrunch.com/2011/05/03/crowdsourced-fundraisingplatform-profounder-now-offers-equity-based-investment-tools/.

98

Id.
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larger entrepreneurs could use crowdfunding momentum to sell securities directly to
the public.99
D. Investment Crowdfunding Compared with Direct Public Offerings
The transition of crowdfunding from the patronage realm into the
investment realm creates some questions about where crowdfunding as a category
leaves off and where traditional investing categories take over. One such question
involves the direct public offering (“DPO”). A DPO is a way for a company to
forego the traditional route of an underwritten IPO by selling securities directly to
friends, customers, and others with an interest in the company.100 Some forms of
investment crowdfunding are essentially DPO processes under a new label.
There is some overlap between investment crowdfunding and DPOs. Both
concepts are geared toward selling securities to the public, and since the mid-1990s
several companies have even done DPOs over the internet.101 DPOs are significant
because most IPOs are done by means of an underwriter, who usually does most of
the work to sell the shares into the market.102 Without an underwriter, a promoter
may need to contract with others—like a financial printer, transfer agent, or
broker—to actually facilitate these sales.103 Yet, the promoter is still in charge of the
offering and is not “borrowing” the reputation of the underwriter.104 Likewise, while
investment crowdfunding is still in its infancy, a promoter, such as a filmmaker,
might eschew an intermediary and appeal to fans directly to purchase investment
shares in an upcoming film.
Despite these similarities, there are key distinctions between investment
crowdfunding and DPOs. First, unlike DPOs, both patronage and investment
99

See Could the web reinvent film industry economics?, NEW MEDIA AGE, July 15, 2010, at 5, available at 2010
WLNR 14168054 (“[W]ith viral channels and increasing knowledge through companies like
Kickstarter and Sellaband in other sectors, we could see models emerge where financial and other
incentives, such as your name in the film credits, prove exciting enough for some to pay big sums.”).
100

William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through an Internet Direct Public Offering: A Sensible Alternative for
Small Companies?, 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 531 (2001).

101

Id. at 531-32.

102

Id. at 534.

103

Id. at 543–44.

104

See generally Bernard S. Black, Information Asymmetry, The Internet, and Securities Offerings, 2 J. SMALL &
EMERGING BUS. L. 91 (1998) (outlining the institutional activities involved in securities markets).
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crowdfunding typically involve intermediaries that serve as matchmakers between
promoters and funders.105 Second, DPOs are typically attempted by companies
looking to raise several million dollars.106 Crowdfunding promoters tend to look for
significantly less; for example, Grow VC looks for initial investments between ten
thousand and one million dollars.107 While this could be seen as a mere difference in
scale, the different motivations of promoters and funders of investment
crowdfunding compared to DPOs are important. Investment crowdfunding mirrors
the ethos of patronage crowdfunding—funding projects aligned with the funder’s
ideology or tastes.108 The DPO generally adheres to the more bottom-line investing
approach common to traditional investing.109
III. ANALYSIS OF CROWDFUNDING VIS-À-VIS U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION
There is an obvious conflict between investment crowdfunding and U.S.
securities regulation. This Part will explore three main issues: (1) to what extent
crowdfunding is governed by U.S. securities regulations; (2) if subject to such laws,
how crowdfunding could function under current securities regulation; and (3) if
current regulations, particularly the registration exemptions, are inadequate, what a
new crowdfunding exemption would look like. Investment, as opposed to
patronage, crowdfunding arrangements likely qualify as investment contract
securities, and are subject to regulation under U.S. securities laws. Furthermore,
while there are ways for investment crowdfunding to work under current
exemptions, many crowdfunding participants would still be excluded. Since current
exemptions are too restrictive, this Article will explore different forms that a new
crowdfunding exemption could take.
A. Is Crowdfunding Governed by U.S. Securities Regulation?
This Section considers whether crowdfunding arrangements can be
considered “securities” by being classified as “investment contracts.”

105

Glaser, supra note 26.

106

See, e.g., Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 581.

107

Ahvenainen, supra note 15.

108

Giriprakash, supra note 78 (“The subscribers may not want returns as much as they want to be part
of an idea which they believe strongly in.”).

109

See generally Sjostrom, supra note 100.
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“Investment Contract” Security

The two fundamental U.S. securities regulation statutes, the Securities Act of
1933 (“33 Act”) and the Exchange Act of 1934 (“34 Act”), never define “security.”110
Instead, they simply provide examples of securities—stocks, bonds, debentures,
investment contracts, and others.111 In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., the Supreme Court
provided more direction by creating a catch-all test for determining whether a
particular investment scheme is an “investment contract” and thus a “security.”112
The Court held that “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his
money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of
the promoter or a third party” is an investment contract subject to securities
regulation.113
2.

Does Crowdfunding Create an “Investment Contract” Security?

Patronage crowdfunding does not create an investment contract. As
described in Part II, patronage crowdfunding is characterized by promoters
rewarding funders with only nominal “thank-you” gifts; funders do not expect profits
from the promoter’s enterprise.114 Thus, patronage crowdfunding does not create an
investment contract under the Howey test and is not governed by U.S. securities
laws.115
In contrast, an investment contract security is created by a Grow VC-like
situation because members invest a certain amount of money into a common
investment pool with the expectation that they will receive a share of the profits
derived from successful projects that they initially support.116 Although this is likely
an investment contract under the Howey test, there are some doubts because

110

See 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2006).

111

Id.

112

See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 297-99 (1946).

113

Id. at 298–99.

114

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 376 (“In return, financial contributors typically receive ‘patronage perks’
such as use of their name in the film credits or album liner notes, advanced autographed copies of the
work, or backstage access at a performer’s show.”).

115

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.

116

See id.; Giriprakash, supra note 78.
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investors are rewarded only when they invest in successful enterprises.117 Perhaps
investors are not deriving profits “solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party.”118
But while investors choose which projects to fund, that is essentially all they
do. Once the projects are selected, Grow VC solely supervises and assists the new
start-up’s growth and profitability, while the investor does little or nothing.120 Lower
courts have long held that “solely” is not a literal limitation.121 Instead, courts
consider whether there is a “reasonable expectation . . . of significant investor
control” in the enterprise; if they have exercised such control, the enterprise could be
excluded from classification as an investment contract.122 The Howey Court would
almost certainly agree that while Grow VC investors play an important part in the
initial selection of projects, they still rely almost entirely on the expertise and
experience of the Grow VC managers to help the start-up become profitable.123
Thus, the investment scheme is an investment contract.124
119

Would this analysis necessarily apply to an investment crowdfunding scheme
different from Grow VC’s? ProFounder, for example, is structured to provide
private placement offerings and therefore involves securities.125 While information
about other investment crowdfunding schemes is scarce, it is unlikely that any
possible investment crowdfunding platform will be able to avoid the investment
contract label. Through these platforms, people invest money with the expectation
of earning profits primarily from the work of the promoter, the intermediary, or

117

See Giriprakash, supra note 78.

118

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74.

119

See generally Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74.

120

Id.

121

See, e.g., United States v. Leonard, 529 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2008).

122

See, e.g., id. (quoting SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1982).).

123

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.

124

Id.

125

See Lang, supra note 93 (asserting that by allowing entrepreneurs to reach out to those with whom
they have a “specific, identifiable connection or affiliation,” the risk of fraud decreases and investors
are protected – the primary goals of securities regulation).
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both.126 At the outset, promoters probably will not want to cede any significant
control over the enterprise.127 Even if investors have some control, it is highly
unlikely that every investor will contribute significantly to the profitability of the
operation. If there are any passive investors, those investors are “led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party.”128 Thus, there is
little chance for an investment crowdfunding operation to avoid qualifying as an
“investment contract” security.
B. The Feasibility of Investment Crowdfunding under Current Securities Regulation
Since most, if not all, investment crowdfunding schemes will fall under the
aegis of U.S. securities laws, we need to consider where to go from here. As an
initial matter, it is illegal for any crowdfunding promoter, or any intermediary, to
offer anyone a security without either registering the offering with the SEC or
complying with an applicable exemption from traditional registration requirements.
This Section will discuss the feasibility of these two options.
1.

Traditional Registration Process

The traditional registration process’s burdens are legendary. Issuers must put
together a detailed registration statement that requires extensive technical assistance
from attorneys and accountants.129 These costs are “relatively fixed, regardless of the
size of the offering,”130 and on the low end, may be in the range of a few hundred
thousand dollars.131 These costs would almost certainly be higher than most small

126

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 383 (“[A] security is sold any time a fan gives money . . . expecting to
share in the profits but does not actively participate in . . . the business. Thus, offering investors a
return . . . over which they have no control would be considered selling securities.”).
127

See id. at 384 (“[M]any artists may not be willing to share creative control, making widespread
acceptance of such a model uncertain.”).

128

See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.

129

William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Carving a New Path to Equity Capital and Share Liquidity, 50 B.C. L. REV. 639,
645 (2009). There are also other costs, like registation fees, printing materials, etc.; see Anand, infra
note 232, at 443.

130

Stephen J. Choi, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small Capital Formation, 2 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 27, 29 (1998).
131

Id. at 35.
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investment crowdfunding promoters’ entire fundraising goals,132 yet they would have
to be paid before any securities were even sold.133 Given these high costs, the
traditional federal exemption process is probably not feasible for these small
crowdfunding promoters.
However, the traditional registration process may not be out of reach for an
investment crowdfunding intermediary. Presumably a company like Grow VC could
afford registration costs under the 33 Act, and may even be able to attract a
reputable underwriter that would make for a successful offering.134 Flush with cash,
Grow VC might then be able to invest in many small-time promoters picked by
Grow VC’s investors. Besides Grow VC, larger financial services companies might
also want to enter the investment crowdfunding market and operate either as
investment companies or even underwriters for small-time promoters.
However, even if an investment crowdfunding intermediary, like Grow VC,
could successfully raise money and gain investors through a registered federal
offering, there may be reasons why it would not want to complete a federal
registration. An issuer would become a public company upon federal registration,
and public companies are subject to rigorous and costly requirements regarding,
among other things, disclosures, proxy statements, and tender offers.135 While
technically feasible for larger crowdfunding intermediaries, these concerns may
discourage many otherwise eligible intermediaries from the federal registration of
securities.
132

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 384 (“Indeed, a standard SEC registration would cost much more in
legal fees than an average recording project-- nullifying much of the Investment Model’s value as an
alternative funding mechanism.”).

133

Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 576 (“Unfortunately, the large majority of costs for a public offering
are incurred up front.”); Stuart R. Cohn & Gregory C. Yadley, Capital Offense: The SEC’s Continuing
Failure to Address Small Business Financing Concerns, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 1, 9 (2007) (“[T]he costs of the
registration process are heavily front-loaded. Accounting fees, attorney retainers, SEC filing fees,
broker-dealer expenses, printing and road show costs are all incurred and become payable prior to the
effective date of the registration statement.”).
134 However, it is important to realize that underwriters are particularly selective. Sjostrom, supra note
2, at 8. (“As a general rule, however, no underwriter will take a company public unless the company
has, at a minimum: (1) annual revenue of $20 million, (2) net income of $1 million, and (3) the
potential to achieve and sustain significant growth rates (such as twenty percent or greater in
revenues) for the next five to ten years.”).
135

Sjostrom, supra note 129, at 643–645.
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Private Placement Offerings

In contrast to public offerings of securities through federal registration, some
investment crowdfunding schemes might work by means of private placement
offerings, which are exempt from full registration under Section 4(2) of the 33 Act.136
These offerings must be carefully tailored to only reach sophisticated or wealthy
investors who have a pre-existing relationship with either the promoter or an affiliate
of the promoter.137 These investors must also agree not to resell their securities
before eligible to do so.138 Since most promoters do not know many of these types
of investors, they must seek out partners, like broker-dealers, who do.139
For small-time crowdfunding promoters, it may be difficult to recruit brokerdealers to help them reach these elusive investors. After all, the profit margin on a
small transaction would not do much to persuade a broker-dealer to become
involved.140 Furthermore, a broker-dealer would not want to bombard, or otherwise
risk alienating, its wealthy clients with insignificant offers.141 Also, if there were any
deals, the transaction costs might consume much of the incoming investment.142
Given these hurdles, private placement offerings are likely not feasible for small-time
investment crowdfunding promoters.143
136

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006).

137

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 14. See generally Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133.

138

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 54 (“As a general rule, restricted securities cannot be resold
except pursuant to Rule 144, the safe harbor adopted by the SEC to determine when restricted
securities, and securities owned by control persons, may be safely resold.”). However, “privately-held
companies often cannot take advantage of the resale safe harbor provided by Rule 144. Rule 144
provides that as a condition for resale there be available at the time of resale ‘adequate public
information’ with respect to the issuer of the securities.” Id. at 55.
139

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 14–15.

140

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 11 (“[B]ecause small transactions are less lucrative than large
ones, they are of less interest to broker-dealers.”).
141

Id.

142

Id.

143

The U.S. government set up an internet site that allows certain issuers to appeal to wealthy
investors, but it is not available broadly for all exemptions. See Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (“The Office of Advocacy of SBA has established
an [i]nternet site where small companies may list their Regulation A and Regulation D 504/SCOR
stock offerings. ACE-Net is a cooperative effort between SBA and nine universities, state-based
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These arrangements are probably more realistic for larger investment
crowdfunding intermediaries. Instead of ordinary investors, an intermediary like
Grow VC could sell investment contracts solely to wealthy and sophisticated
investors.144 Likewise, this funding mechanism could work with other potential
crowdfunding intermediary models, such as the crowdfunding mutual fund
intermediary or the crowdfunding underwriter. However, to make this work, the
crowdfunding intermediary would need to be large and profitable enough to make it
worth the time for the broker-dealer and its wealthy clients.145
Besides issues of feasibility, the fact that all the members of the “crowd” are
wealthy and sophisticated may strain the limits, definition-wise, of the crowdfunding
label.146 In other words, while there may be a many-to-one relationship between
funders and a small-time promoter, the fact that the funders are all wealthy seems to
go against a fundamental, if largely unarticulated, crowdfunding ethos that values
broad participation by ordinary people who are not exclusively interested in profit.147
Thus, this type of arrangement with only wealthy funders might not truly be
“crowdfunding.”
3.

Intrastate Exemptions

In addition to the private placement offering exemption, the intrastate
exemption is another statutory exemption from federal registration in Section
3(a)(11) of the 33 Act.148 There are typically three requirements to qualify for this
type of exemption: (1) the promoter must be incorporated or otherwise have its
principal place of business in the targeted state where it offers the security; (2) the

entities, and other non-profit organizations to provide a listing service where small companies may list
their stock offering for review by high net worth investors (accredited investors).”).
144

See Bradford, supra note 7, at 17.

145

See id. at 3-4.

146

See id. at 4.

147

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 385 (“These investments are not driven solely by the profit motive . . .
.”); Michael Miner, Pay for News, Then Brag About It, READER, Apr. 8, 2010, at 6, available at 2010
WLNR 9281201 (“It’s not only about making money. It’s about getting people to invest in your site
and make a deeper connection with your site.”).
148

15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2006).
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promoter must carry out a significant amount of its business in that state; and (3) the
promoter may make offers and sales only to residents of that state.149
These requirements make it difficult, if not impossible, for a small-time
crowdfunding promoter to sell securities over the internet. Even if a promoter were
organized under the laws of a particular state, conducted most of its business in that
state, and planned on using the money it raised in that state, it can only make offers
to other residents of that state.150 If a promoter makes an offer to even one nonresident, then the exemption is lost.151 This is hard to comply with because the SEC
construes “offer” to mean anything that conditions the market for a future sale.152
Under this broad definition of “offer,” a promoter making a pitch directly on its own
website, or indirectly through a crowdfunding intermediary, will have likely made a
general offer to anyone who visits that site.
There are ways to get around this general solicitation problem, though. The
promoter (if it is a direct offering) or a crowdfunding intermediary might offer
potential funders the chance to pre-register for offerings only for residents of a
particular state, without disclosing the offer itself.153 However, before pursuing this
internet-based pre-registration system, it would be wise to seek a “no-action” letter
from the SEC.154 Yet, even if the SEC staff were inclined to grant such a request,
these letters are not binding, and thus provide limited comfort.155 The precarious
nature of no-action letters might give pause not only to the promoter who received
the letter, but also to other promoters who want to follow a similar course.156

149

See Q&A: Small Business and the SEC , supra note 143.

150

Id.

151

Id.

152

See generally Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133; Sjostrom, supra note 100.

153

Cf. IPONet, SEC No-Action Letters, [1996 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶77,252 (July
26, 1996) (approving web site access method to register and qualify accredited or sophisticated
investors before offering them any private placement deals).

154

See generally id.

155

Staff Interpretations, SEC, www.sec.gov/interps.shtml (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).

156

See Jonas A. Marson, Surfing the Web for Capital: The Regulation of Internet Securities Offerings, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 281, 308–09 (2000) (“Companies wishing to raise small sums
over the [i]nternet, or services linking such issuers with investors, should no longer have to rely on a
string of no-action letters to guide their actions. Indeed, the president of IPONet has complained that
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In addition to these barriers, an issuer of securities would need to comply
with state registration requirements, which may impose many of the same
requirements as full-blown federal registration.157 While a later section addresses
some of the specific concerns with state registration, suffice it to say that it may
impose significant legal and accounting costs on an issuer.158 Small-time investment
crowdfunding promoters might be able to reduce some of these costs, but perhaps
not enough to make the intrastate exemption a feasible option, especially considering
the inherent limitations of only selling securities to fellow residents.159 Larger
crowdfunding intermediaries, like Grow VC, would probably be able to afford state
registration, but it does not make much sense for a large company to use the
intrastate exemption because it must confine the scope of its operation to just one
state.160
Regulation A

4.

Besides the statutory exemptions from federal registration, there are several
administratively created exemptions, one of which is Regulation A (“Reg A”).161
This exemption allows certain issuers the opportunity to avoid full federal
registration by following a simplified mini-registration process.162 This process
excuses issuers from many requirements, like the need for audited financial
statements.163 Reg A also has two other attractive features: (1) issuers may “test the
waters” to gauge interest in the offering,164 and (2) investors may freely trade Reg A
shares on the open market.165

most companies have refused to use his service due to fear of liability, despite the fact that IPONet
itself was granted a no-action letter.”).
157

Bradford, supra note 7, at 89.

158

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 13.

159

See Q&A: Small Business and the SEC , supra note 143.

160

Id.

161

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–230.263 (2010).

162

Bradford, supra note 7, at 32.

163

See Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 542.

164

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (2010); see also Kappel, supra note 1, at 384.

165

See Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 543.
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Reg A seems to be an appealing option, especially for small-time investment
crowdfunding promoters.166 After all, they could gauge interest in their offering before
committing the time and money to prepare a Reg A offering statement.167
Unfortunately, while Reg A excuses issuers from many onerous registration
requirements, state law remains an obstacle. Issuers are required to follow state
registration requirements in each state where they intend to offer or sell securities.168
Because few states provide a parallel exemption to Reg A, most advantages of using
Reg A are nullified.169 Thus, for small-time promoters, Reg A is not a feasible option.
For larger intermediaries, the question of feasibility is irrelevant because Reg A
excludes investment companies from using the exemption.170
5.

Regulation D

The other major administrative exemption is Regulation D (“Reg D”),171
which is actually three different exemptions: Rule 504, Rule 505, and Rule 506.172
Under each of these exemptions, an issuer can raise different dollar amounts.173
However, all three exemptions are subject to several important restrictions. For
instance, most issuers may not make general solicitations, and most investors may
not freely transfer their shares.174 Additionally, under Rules 505 and 506, issuers are
largely limited to selling shares to larger institutions or wealthy individuals.175

166

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 384 (“This ‘testing the waters’ provision may allow Investment Model
sellers to gauge the level of interest in a particular artist before creating and offering securities to
potential investors, thereby avoiding unnecessary legal fees spent on artists with no likelihood of
raising sufficient capital to fund a recording.”).
167

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.254 (2010).

168

Bradford, supra note 7, at 89.

169

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 28.

170

17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(4) (2010).

171

Id. §§ 230.501–230.508.

172

Id. §§ 230.504-230.506.

173

Id. Under Rule 504, issuers may offer no more than an aggregate of one million dollars in a twelvemonth period. They can raise more under Rule 505 (up to five million dollars), and Rule 506 imposes
no limit at all. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 30.
174

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 30.

175

Id.
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Much of the discussion above regarding private placement offerings applies
to Rules 505 and 506.176 After all, they share the same basic prohibition on general
solicitation and the same focus on selling to wealthy investors.177 Thus, small-time
investment crowdfunding promoters probably will have little luck attracting a
broker-dealer to facilitate contact with wealthy clients.178 Some crowdfunding
intermediaries may even have trouble reaching these wealthy investors. In other
words, Rules 505 and 506 are probably not much help to small-time promoters, but
may be useful for larger intermediaries in certain circumstances.
In contrast, Rule 504 may be useful to small-time promoters, and perhaps
even to intermediaries. The million-dollar limit seems appropriate, and investors
need not be wealthy or sophisticated.179 If an issuer complies with state registration
requirements, there may even be general solicitations and free trading of shares.180
Thus, the feasibility of a Rule 504 exemption seems to turn mostly on the feasibility
of state registration requirements.
6.

State Registration Requirements

Even if an issuer qualifies for an exemption from federal registration
requirements, it likely still must comply with state registration requirements in every
state in which it intends to offer or sell securities.181 This creates problems in the
176

See discussion infra Part III.B.2.

177

17 C.F.R. §§ 230.505-230.506 (2010).

178

There is, however, an effort to create a network of sophisticated and wealthy investors. A Silicon
Valley investor, Naval Ravikant, “recently launched his own push into crowdfunding with AngelList, a
site that enables entrepreneurs to contact a growing group of angel investors around the country.”
Clipped Wings, DAILY DEAL (Jul. 29, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 16283159. The problem is that the
new financial reform legislation makes it harder for investors to qualify as “accredited investors.” Id.
(“In an attempt to protect unsophisticated investors, the sweeping financial reform legislation signed
into law by President Obama July 21 raises the bar an individual must clear to be considered an
‘accredited investor’ -- one who is cleared to invest in certain ‘high risk’ assets. For decades, an
individual had to earn more than $200,000 in annual income and own net assets worth more than $1
million, a standard that for many was relatively easy to meet. But under the new law, an investor’s
home is no longer considered an asset.”). Some estimate this new change may reduce the number of
angel investors by half. Id.

179

Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 9.

180

17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(1) (2010).

181

Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 11. The two broad exceptions to this requirement are private placement
offerings and offerings made pursuant to Rule 506 of Reg D, which excuses the issuer from any state
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context of investment crowdfunding because it means that an issuer would have to
screen potential funders based on their residency. Furthermore, it creates a tension,
if not a paradox, between the viability of the offering and the costs of even making
the offering. After all, the offer will be more viable if available in more states, but
more states mean higher costs. Small-time promoters may only be able to afford to
register in a few states, which may jeopardize the viability of their offerings. Larger
intermediaries might be able to bear some of these costs, but the million-dollar limit
might make a broadly available offering infeasible given the fixed costs.
The process for the issuer will be easier and more cost-effective to the extent
that there is more overlap between the materials needed to qualify for federal
exemptions and those needed for state registration requirements.182 There is a
continuum of overlap between the two systems, with some federal exemptions
having quite a bit of overlap with state requirements, and others with almost none.183
On one end of the continuum is Rule 504 of Reg D, which has requirements similar
to most state requirements.184 On the other end, Reg A has almost nothing in
common with state requirements, which nullifies its most attractive features, like the
ability to “test the waters” or the free trade of shares.185
While there are varying levels of discrepancy between state and federal
requirements, most states have adopted some uniform registration requirements.186
Yet, states often implement these requirements in different ways.187 Thus, issuers
registration requirements. Id. at 11-12. However, as previously discussed, these exceptions are very
restrictive.
182

See Kappel, supra note 1, at 384 (“[T]he costs saved from the federal registration exemption are
somewhat offset by the multitude of state law compliance requirements.”).

183

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 40-42.

184

See id. at 29–31; Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 58–59.

185

Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 543.

186

Marc I. Steinberg & Chris Claassen, Attorney Liability Under the State Securities Laws: Landscapes and
Minefields, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 8 (2005).

187

See Daniel Everett Giddings, Comment, An Innovative Link Between the Internet, the Capital Markets,
and the SEC: How the Internet Direct Public Offering Helps Small Companies Looking to Raise Capital, 25 PEPP.
L. REV. 785, 790–91 (1998); Q&A: Small Business and the SEC, supra note 143 (“Historically, most
state legislatures have followed one of two approaches in regulating public offerings of securities, or a
combination of the two approaches. Some states review small businesses’ securities offerings to
ensure that companies disclose to investors all information needed to make an informed investment
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subject to these laws must usually hire experts familiar with state-specific registration
requirements. Legal costs will rise proportionally to the number of states in which
an issuer sells securities. Beyond legal fees, most states require audited financial
statements,188 which, can be extremely costly. For a small-time promoter, these
requirements may prove onerous.189 After all, legal and accounting fees must be paid
before any securities are sold.190
However, there are ways to avoid requirements for audited financial
information. Most states allow small companies to use Small Company Offering
Registration (“SCOR”) forms to register their offering,191 and the North American
Securities Administrators Association (“NASAA”) publishes a manual on how to
complete these forms.192 Under NASAA guidelines, while independent certified
public accountants (“CPAs”) must audit most financial statements, they may instead
simply review the financial statements of issuers that meet certain conditions.193
Companies that have never publically sold securities and whose present offering is

decision. Other states also analyze public offerings using substantive standards to assure that the
terms and structure of the offerings are fair to investors, in addition to the focus on disclosure.”).
188

See infra note 192.

189

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 13 (“The need to review state law adds uncertainty and expense
to a small private offering, and where there are only a few known prospective purchasers in a
particular state, the time and costs of investigation and state qualification may not be worth the
effort.”).
190

See sources cited supra note 133.

191

Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 551. See generally SCOR Overview, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES
ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., http://www.nasaa.org/industry___regulatory_resources/
corporation_finance/535.cfm (last visited Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SCOR Overview] (“The SCOR
Form is not available for use in connection with every type of securities offering. The Form was
designed for use by companies seeking to raise capital through a public offering of securities exempt
from registration with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under SEC Regulation A,
Rule 504 of SEC Regulation D (“Rule 504”), or Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act of 1933.”).
192

SCOR: General Instructions, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
http://www.nasaa.org/industry___regulatory_resources/corporation_finance/545.cfm (last visited
Oct. 8, 2011) [hereinafter SCOR Instructions].

193

SCOR Statement of Policy, NORTH AMERICAN SECURITIES ADMINISTRATORS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(Apr. 28, 1996), http://www.nasaa.org/industry___regulatory_resources/
corporation_finance/556.cfm [hereinafter SCOR Statement of Policy].
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under one million dollars qualify for this privilege.194
While most small
crowdfunding promoters would likely qualify for these reduced burdens, it is unclear
whether the accounting costs would be reduced enough to make state registration
feasible.
Because intermediaries have more financial resources, a larger investment
crowdfunding intermediary probably can afford to comply with state registration
requirements.195 However, because it costs more to register in more states,
promoters must raise more money to cover expenses.196 With increased costs,
intermediaries may avoid funding the smallest promoters because they will be more
trouble than they are worth.197 In the end, these large investment crowdfunding
intermediaries may start to act more like the traditional financial services institutions
that have long ignored and rejected small-time promoters.198 If that becomes the
case, then crowdfunding will come full circle and become part of the problem it was
originally designed to fix.
C. New Crowdfunding Exemption
As discussed above, the current securities framework in the United States
makes it extremely difficult for most promoters, and even some larger intermediaries,
to build a vibrant investment crowdfunding market. However, there is some interest
in the creation of a new exemption specifically for investment crowdfunding. This
Section addresses some proposals for a new exemption, and makes a proposal for a
new crowdfunding exemption.

194

Id.

195

It is important to realize that not all investment crowdfunding intermediaries will be able to take
advantage of the simplified SCOR forms. See SCOR Statement of Policy, supra note 193.

196

See Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 544–45.

197

See Subramanium & Bhuva, supra note 21, at 74 (“‘The efforts that go into getting a start-up funded
are no different from those involved in making a growth investment. And the latter is more
remunerative because of its larger ticket size.’”).
198

See Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 3.
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Kassan Petition for Rulemaking

1.

In July 2010, Jenny Kassan filed a petition for rulemaking with the SEC.199
The petition asked the SEC, pursuant to Rule 192(a) of the Rules of Practice,200 to
“adopt a rule exempting individual purchases of securities totaling $100 or less from
registration requirements and from all other requirements other than [a few express
exceptions].”201 Kassan’s petition suggests several requirements:
1) No purchaser may invest more than $100.
2) The aggregate offering must be limited to $100,000.
3) Offerors must be individuals. Offerors may not be entities, and
must be United States Citizens or legal residents.
4) No offeror may have more than one offering open at any time.
5) All offering materials and communications must contain a
disclaimer clearly stating the possibility of total loss of the investment
and the necessity of careful evaluation of each offeror's
trustworthiness by the individual purchaser.202
In support thereof, Kassan’s petition mentions the importance of capital for
small businesses, and the impracticability of seeking out capital in accordance with
current regulation.203 Specifically, it describes how “small enterprises are often stifled
because of an inability to raise funds” and “[e]ven though there may be no shortage
of interested investors, and no shortage of capacity for these small enterprises to
reward their investors, securities regulations create a prohibitive hurdle.”204 Kassan
posits that her proposal would alleviate these problems, while maintaining investor
protections.205 “The small amount at stake and maximum aggregate cap ensure the
199

Letter from Jenny Kassan, Sustainable Economies Law Center, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Office of
the Secretary, SEC (Jul. 1, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2010/petn4-605.pdf
[hereinafter Kassan petition].
200

17 C.F.R. § 201.192 (2010).

201

Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7.

202

Id.

203

Id. at 1–2.

204

Id. at 2.

205

Id. at 7–8.

94

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

protection of investors while furthering the public interest in this type of
investment.”206
Since Kassan filed this petition, there have been over fifty original articles
posted on the SEC’s webpage commenting on the petition.207 While most of these
articles support the proposal,208 there is no broad agreement on the dollar limitations.
For example, many commentators want higher dollar limitations—some as low as
$250 per investor with a $250,000 cap,209 others as high as $1,000 per investor with a
$1,000,000 cap.210 There is also no broad agreement on whether anti-fraud
provisions would apply. While many commentators have expressed the general
desirability of investor protection,211 most are comfortable with a caveat emptor

206

Id. at 2.

207

See Comments on Rulemaking Petition, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/Articles/4-605/4-605.shtml (last
visited Sept. 6, 2011).

208

However, while all the posted Articles are supportive, there are skeptics within the crowfunding
community. See, e.g., Kevin Lawton on Strategy, CHANGE CROWDFUNDING LAW (Jul. 23, 2010),
http://crowdfundinglaw.posterous.com/kevin-lawton-on-strategy (“Ironically, [the Kassan] initiative
may actually harm the chances for legal crowdfunded securities at any economically meaningful level.
The SEC may eventually green-light this exemption as a way to throw a bone to the crowdfunding
crowd (and avoid significant change). And because government is slow, it will be even more years
before those numbers would be revisited.”). Instead of the current proposal, some argue that there
should be a more carefully considered proposal that truly represents the major crowdfunding players.
Id. (“For a rulemaking petition to the SEC, a better approach would be to hammer out a more
inclusive proposal with a small, smart group that includes experts on community-supported
entrepreneurship, the heads of the big crowdfunding sites, and people in the business investment
world. Come up with a proposal that appeals to all of these groups, and then rally everyone to support
this new proposal, retracting the current one and transferring its momentum to the new one. The
SEC would be more moved by an explicit, ‘Here’s the one killer crowdfunding proposal that all of
these diverse groups support,’ than any possible implicit, ‘A bunch of competing pro-crowdfunding
petitions have been submitted for your review by different groups-- they all ask for slightly different
things-- good luck figuring it out!’).
209

See, e.g., Letter from Seth Elliott to
http://www.sec.gov/Articles/4-605/4605-8.htm.

the

SEC

(Jul.

10,

2010),

available

at

210

See e.g., Letter from James J. Angel, Assoc. Professor of Finance, Georgetown Univ., to the SEC
(Sept. 21, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/Articles/4-605/4605-33.pdf [hereinafter Angel
Letter].

211

See, e.g., Letter from Paul Spinrad to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary, SEC (Aug. 26, 2010), available
at http://www.sec.gov/Articles/4-605/4605-16.pdf.
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approach under which any anti-fraud provisions would be eliminated.212 These
commentators believe that a small investment cap is sufficient to protect investors.213
2.

Critique of the Kassan Petition

The rules proposed in the Kassan petition would make investment
crowdfunding easy and accessible. Recognizing that current regulation is far too
complicated, it proposes some simple, plain-English rules.214 By stating that these
should be the only applicable rules, the petition implicitly argues that state
registration laws should be preempted by any new federal rules.215 Preemption
would both simplify the process for small promoters and reduce the costs
involved.216 Because the proposed rules are so simple, promoters could dispense
with the expensive assistance of lawyers and accountants altogether.217 Without
those expenses, crowdfunding promoters could keep more of what they raise, up to
$100,000, which seems like a reasonable cap given the amounts currently being raised
on patronage crowdfunding sites.218
While this Article supports a crowdfunding exemption, it does not agree with
Kassan’s proposal for how such an exemption should be written. Although Kassan’s
proposal would give investment crowdfunding promoters everything they want, it is
too idealistic. After all, Kassan’s solution to the conflict between crowdfunding and
the securities regulatory regime suggests simply to discard all state and federal
securities regulations and to substitute in their place five simple rules.219 That may
not be such a bad idea, especially if the regulations are not worth saving. However,
while this clean-sweep approach would be satisfying to many small-time
promoters—and to many others advocating for simpler regulations—it does not
seem likely to transpire.

212

See e.g., Angel Letter, supra note 210.

213

See id.

214

Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7.

215

See id.

216

See id. at 3-4.

217

Id. at 2.
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Id. at 7-8.
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Id.
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In 1992, the SEC amended Rule 504 of Reg D to drastically reduce the
restrictions on small issuers, who could then make general solicitations and sell
securities that could be freely traded on the open market.220 The SEC’s rationale was
that “the size and local nature of these small offerings did not appear to warrant
imposing extensive federal regulation.”221 However, seven years later, the SEC
reversed course and readopted the pre-1992 restrictions.222 This reaction was
prompted by a surge of “pump and dump” schemes perpetuated by unscrupulous
promoters.223 Given this example, the SEC may suffer from a “once bitten, twice
shy” attitude toward small-issuer concerns.
Setting aside the significant issue of whether the SEC would enact such a farreaching proposal, there are several reasons why Kassan’s clean-sweep approach may
not promote the long-term interests of crowdfunding. While many legitimate
promoters will initially benefit from regulatory liberalization, there is a serious danger
that, ultimately, these new laissez faire regulations may, like the Rule 504
amendment, allow unscrupulous promoters to victimize unsophisticated investors.224
In other words, if the pendulum swings too far toward deregulation, there is a risk of
killing the crowdfunding goose that lays the golden egg.
In addition to the above concerns, the Kassan approach arguably throws the
baby (market efficiency and investor protection) out with the regulatory bathwater.
The modern securities regulatory framework is essentially designed to advance at
least two broad principles: (1) providing investors with access to accurate material
information about companies225 and (2) protecting investors from market
220

Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 25

221

Id. (quoting Revision of Rule 504 of Regulation D, the “Seed Capital” Exemption, Release No. 337644 (Feb. 25, 1999), 1999 SEC LEXIS 408, at *6).
222

Id.

223

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 71–72 (“Rule 504 was being used by nefarious promoters to
distribute up to $1 million of securities in New York to a select favored group, followed promptly by
boiler-room promotions that artificially drove up the secondary market price until such time as the
initial purchasers could sell their shares at a handsome profit, leaving the gullible crop of new
investors with suddenly deflated shares and irrecoverable losses.”); Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 25.

224
225

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 71-72; Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 25-26.

See The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last updated July 25, 2011)
(“The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United States derive from a simple and
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manipulation and fraud.226 After all, it is widely believed that an efficient market
depends on accurate material information and a means of punishing those
committing fraud who might otherwise scare investors from the capital markets.227
Kassan’s proposal disregards both of these principles with little explanation.
It disregards the first principle, the availability of accurate material information, by
not requiring any specific information about the business itself.228 Besides the
boilerplate warning,229 the only disclosure that the promoter would have to make is
his or her name.230 While promoters probably would voluntarily disclose some
information about their business, the lack of uniformity between disclosures would
make it hard for investors to compare promoters.231 Without specific guidelines,
promoters would be free to paint rosy pictures of their businesses without
mentioning any potential risks or liabilities.232 Consequently, if one promoter is free
to puff its prospects to gain funders, other promoters will likely follow suit, and the
result would be a crowdfunding market full of unrealistic, and likely fraudulent, sales
straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or private individuals, should have
access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it, and so long as they hold it. . . .
Only through the steady flow of timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make
sound investment decisions. The result of this information flow is a far more active, efficient, and
transparent capital market that facilitates the capital formation so important to our nation’s
economy.”).
226

See id. (“The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities world, including securities
exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment advisors, and mutual funds. Here the SEC is
concerned primarily with promoting the disclosure of important market-related information,
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud. Crucial to the SEC’s effectiveness in each of
these areas is its enforcement authority. . . . Typical infractions include insider trading, accounting
fraud, and providing false or misleading information about securities and the companies that issue
them.”).
227

See id.; Black, supra note 104, at 93.

228

See Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7-8.

229

Id. at 8 (“All offering materials and communications must contain a disclaimer clearly stating the
possibility of total loss of the investment, and the necessity of careful evaluation of each offeror’s
trustworthiness by the individual purchaser.”).

230

Id.

231

Black, supra note 104, at 96–97.

232

Anita Indira Anand, The Efficiency of Direct Public Offerings, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 433, 455
(2003); Black, supra note 104, at 92.
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pitches.233 Without the availability of uniform, accurate, and material information
about promoters and their businesses, the market might degrade, prices might fall,
and investors might not want to invest because the investments all sound too good
to be true.234 This is often called the “death spiral,” a problem the United States has
avoided by imposing “a complex set of private and public institutions that give
investors reasonable assurance that the issuer is truthful.”235 Yet, Kassan makes no
mention of this traditional concern for the health of the market.
While Kassan’s proposal ignores the first traditional principle of securities
regulation, it does address the second principle: protecting investors from market
manipulation and fraud.236 Kassan argues, “The limitation of a $100 maximum
investment by each purchaser ensures investor protection by preventing individuals
from incurring significant financial risk. Even a total loss of $100 is unlikely to be
financially crippling for anyone considering investment.”237 She continues, “The
aggregate maximum of $100,000 furthers the public interest by preventing large
devastating aggregate losses in a single community.”238 These limitations probably,
but not necessarily,239 limit investor losses to a reasonable degree.
233

Anand, supra note 232, at 455. (“An adverse selection problem exists because investors are unable
to discern which issuers are truthful; investors therefore discount the prices that they will offer for all
securities. High-quality issuers exit the market, forgoing a potentially valuable investment opportunity,
because they are unable to obtain a fair price for their securities. Low-quality issuers remain in the
market and, ‘[a]s a result, investors discount still more the prices they will pay. This in turn only drives
more honest issuers away from the market and exacerbates the adverse selection problem.’”)
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted).
234

See Black, supra note 104, at 92 (“In modern lingo, securities markets are a particularly vivid
example of a market for lemons. Investors don’t know which issuers are truthful and which aren’t, so
they discount the prices they will offer for all securities. That makes honest issuers less interested in
offering securities, but doesn’t discourage the dishonest ones.”); Iris H-Y Chiu, Securities Intermediaries
in the Internet Age and the Traditional Principal-Agent Model of Regulation: Some Observations from European
Union Securities Regulation, 2 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 307, 311 (2007).
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Black, supra note 104, at 92.

236

Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7-8.
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Id. at 7.
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While under this proposal a person may only invest $100 in any one project, there is no limitation
on the number of projects to which an investor may contribute. So, if a person invested in several
dozen projects, potential losses could run into the thousands of dollars.
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However, even though it is important to limit investor losses, Kassan’s
approach does not deter or punish unscrupulous promoters. Professor Stephen
Choi remarks in his article, Gatekeepers and the Internet: Rethinking the Regulation of Small
Business Capital Formation, that “[s]mall companies . . . pose the greatest risk to
investors of fraud”240 and “present investors with the greatest risk of getting stuck
with a lemon.”241 Choi also mentions that while “the number of small businesses
able to seek capital may increase over the [i]nternet, the proportion of fraudulent
issuers will also rise.”242
It is not clear whether Kassan is skeptical of the merits of anti-fraud liability
in general, or whether she merely believes that the benefits of such liability are
outweighed by the burdens imposed on small-time promoters.243 Perhaps she
recognizes that “no amount of technical exemption requirements will hinder the
fraud artists from their endeavors.”244 Yet, she ignores the danger of a “death spiral”
due to the presence of too many dishonest issuers in the market.245 In any case,
Kassan seems comfortable to jettison anti-fraud liability without much explanation
and replace traditional protections with a de facto “caveat funder” attitude.246 She
240

Choi, supra note 130, at 29.

241

Id. at 31.

242

Id. at 38.

243

Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 4.

244

Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 72; see Choi, supra note 130, at 40 (“The level of disclosure may
be too great or too costly. Antifraud rules may lead to frivolous suits against companies and therefore
only raise costs without generating much deterrence against fraud.”).
245

See Black, supra note 104, at 93 (“[I]nstitutions and ‘reputational intermediaries’ reduce both the
likelihood of fraud or extreme puffing, and the extent of adverse selection. They thus attract honest
issuers into the securities market, at the same time that they drive at least some dishonest issuers out
of the securities market. As the average quality of disclosure improves, investors will place greater
faith in issuer disclosures, and will pay more for securities. This, in turn, will attract still more highquality issuers to the securities market. The death spiral of the unregulated market can become a
virtuous spiral instead, as long as dishonest issuers can be (mostly) kept out of the market.”) (emphasis added).
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See Christine Hurt, Peer-to-Peer Microfinancing for the Arts? Looking at Kickstarter, CONGLOMERATE
BLOG (Jul. 9, 2010), available at 2010 WLNR 13822720 (“Kickstarter seems to have adopted a ‘caveat
backer’ approach and merely tells would-be backers to ‘use your internet street smarts.’”). Other
articles suggest that the principal means of protecting investors is by disclosure requirements.
Prospectus,
CROWDFUNDING
CAMPAIGN
TO
CHANGE
CROWDFUNDING
LAW,
http://www.panix.com/~pspinrad/prospectus (last visited Aug. 31, 2011) (“Much of securities law is
rightly devoted to protecting investors. The main way it does this is by detailing the documents that

100

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 13

suggests simply warning investors that they should carefully invest after checking the
identity of the promoter, who is essentially given a license to steal up to $100 per
investor and $100,000 per enterprise.247
Besides imprudently dismissing some of the fundamental principles of the
modern securities regulatory regime, Kassan does not explain four important
practical ramifications of her proposal. First, she does not address whether
crowdfunding promoters should be exempted from broker-dealer requirements.248
Second, she does not address the role of intermediaries.249 Third, she does not
discuss whether these new crowdfunding securities would be freely traded in the
general market, and if so, what impact they would have on “pump and dump”
scams.250 Finally, because the proposal disqualifies entities, it is unclear how a
promoter would actually issue a security.251
Alternate Proposal for New Exemption

3.

Despite the weaknesses in the Kassan proposal, there are ways to modify it
to create a more pragmatic exemption for investment crowdfunding. Parts of the
Kassan proposal must be included in any new exemption. First, given the
fragmented nature of state registration requirements and the inefficiency of
complying with two often wholly disjointed regimes, a new federal exemption should
preempt state law.252 Second, there must be no limits on general solicitation.253
offerers must produce and deliver to investors-- prospectuses, periodic financial statements, etc., all of
which are must be audited independently and carry appropriate warnings. In the 1930s these
envelopes full of printed matter were essential, but there’s another basic way to protect investors from
losing their shirts: Limit the ‘losable’ amount. Cap the level of investment that anyone can make to some
value that’s closer to the cost of a lottery ticket than to a mortgage.”) (emphasis in original).
247

Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7.

248

Sjostrom, supra note 100, at 565 (“[U]nder the Uniform Securities Act, neither a DPO company
nor its agents would have to register as broker-dealers. However, some states specifically include a
company distributing its securities directly to the public without using a broker-dealer within the
definition of dealer. Therefore, a company conducting a DPO in one of these states would have to
register as a dealer.”) (footnote omitted).
249

See Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7-8.

250

Id..

251

Id. at 7.

252

State regulators, of course, disagree with any proposal to take away anything from their jurisdiction.
Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 48–49. They “often bear the brunt of criticism when defrauded investors
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Third, circumscribed dollar limitations should be included to prevent significant
investor losses while also allowing small companies to raise sufficient capital.254 The
caps should probably reflect the stringency of the actual exemption (i.e., the more
stringent the exemption, the more money allowed) and should allow accredited
investors to invest more than unaccredited investors. Fourth, promoters should be
limited to one offering at a time to make compliance easier to monitor.255 Finally,
promoters should be required to provide investors with a disclaimer that this type of
investment is inherently risky and should be evaluated carefully for
trustworthiness.256
Beyond these requirements, a new exemption should maintain the balance
among the needs for capital financing, market efficiency, and investor protection.
To that end, before issuing securities, promoters should be able to gauge how much
support there is for such an offering. This could be accomplished, for example, by
using a crowdfunding pledge system. Once a promoter decides to issue securities, it
should have to comply with streamlined registration and disclosure requirements.257
These requirements should excuse small issuers from producing audited financial
statements, thereby reducing the initial barriers to entry. However, excused issuers
should either (1) be subject to other financial statement verifications, like the relaxed
standards under the NAASA guidelines, or (2) have stricter limits on the dollar
amounts they could raise. After securities are issued pursuant to this new exemption,

discover their losses” and are thus legitimately concerned about deregulation that may open the door
to fraud. Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 61. However, “the status quo is equally inimical to the
universally acknowledged desire to facilitate capital raising opportunities for legitimate small
businesses.” Id. To resolve this stalemate, it may be necessary to use federal preemption, unless states
are willing to coordinate with federal regulators to create a workable small issuer exemption. See id.
253

Kevin Lawton on Strategy, supra note 208 (“[T]o move the ‘soul’ of crowdfunding forward, to activate
its ability to reach and leverage the greater talents and expertise of the many outsiders over the few
insiders-- the wisdom of the crowd-- the prohibition against General Solicitation is the more
important first target.”); see Sjostrom, supra note 2, at 4.
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Kassan petition, supra note 199, at 7.
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Id. at 8.
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A more relaxed liability standard (perhaps gross negligence) for misstatements and omissions
should be used to enforce the accuracy of these requirements.
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trading requirements should be imposed to limit the danger of “pump and dump”
scams.258
The role of crowdfunding intermediaries is another important consideration
for any new crowdfunding exemption. In a traditional IPO, underwriters play an
important role in not only the efficient sale of securities to end-investors, but also as
intermediaries that conduct due diligence on behalf of investors.259 Underwriters
tend to be important bridges between issuers and investors because they arguably
maximize value for issuers and reduce risks for investors.260 Given that larger
underwriters may not be interested in small distributions because they are not
profitable enough, a new crowdfunding exemption could include provisions making
it easier for smaller underwriters to serve the crowdfunding market. For the same
reasons, a new exemption should relax requirements for investment companies.
Crowdfunding intermediaries should be involved in this relaxation of requirements
to reduce information asymmetry and to ensure the future vitality of investment
crowdfunding.
4.

The Possibility of SEC Action

Having discussed some of the potential forms a new crowdfunding
exemption could take, how likely is SEC action? While the SEC has paid lip service
to the concerns of small companies vis-à-vis the deficiencies of current regulation for
many years now, very little action has been taken.261 Despite various theories, the
rationale for this inaction is not fully clear.262 The SEC may not want to liberalize the
rules for small offerings because of the possible political blowback if securities fraud
increases.263 Additionally, in the wake of budgetary strain and increased duties
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See Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 71-72.
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Anand, supra note 232, at 437-38; see Choi, supra note 130, at 43–46.
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Anand, supra note 232, at 438.
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Cohn & Yadley, supra note 133, at 1 (“Despite years of criticism from small business advocates, the
Securities and Exchange Commission has made little effort to ameliorate the severe burdens on small
companies seeking to raise capital in compliance with the Securities Act of 1933 and SEC
regulations.”).
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Id. at 68–77 (noting three possible theories).

See Ross Pruden, Biracy & Crowdfunding—Peril or Paradise?, A CURIOUS LIFE (Jan. 9, 2010),
http://rosspruden.blogspot.com/2010/01/biracy-crowdfundingperil-or-paradise.html (“[Y]ou never
really know how governments react to radical new business models. Once crowdfunding begins to
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pursuant to financial reform legislation, the SEC may have neither the time nor the
resources to address this issue.
Even so, a growing chorus is calling for regulatory reform, and it may only be
a matter of time before it compels the SEC to modernize its approach to small
company offerings.264 In May 2011, the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform (“OGR”) held a hearing designed to “provide lawmakers with
an opportunity to better understand how securities regulations have harmed public
and private capital formation in the United States,”265 taking it as a given that
securities laws harm capital formation. With such a shot across the bow, SEC
Chairman Mary Shapiro defended her agency’s very legitimacy.266 In an earlier letter
from Shapiro to OGR Chairman Darrell Issa, she respectfully explained the
Commission’s difficult job:
Regardless of the form or size of the offering, companies seeking
access to capital in the U.S. markets should not be overburdened by
unnecessary or superfluous regulations. At the same time, all
offerings must, of course, provide the necessary information and
protections to give investors the confidence they need to invest in
our markets. Striking the right balance between facilitating access to

become popular, all it takes is one egregious crowdfunding scandal to push the SEC towards clamping
down on ‘risky new businesses using securities law loopholes to rip off unsuspecting victims’”).
264

Prospectus, supra note 246 (“If this enthusiasm can be mobilized towards the SEC in a way that
guarantees their engagement, such as on their own website, that’s a win. Their reputation has been
battered recently, for good reason, and they may be looking for ways to show that they want to help
the little guy. Regulatory reform is in the air, and Congress is currently reviewing a bill to change
financial regulations. These things generally come to the table top-down, but this project proposes a
relatively simple regulatory change that would spark innovation and financial activity from the bottom
up.”); see Kappel, supra note 1, 385 (“Clearly, establishing these [crowdfunding] models in the U.S. will
not be easy, but perhaps the country is primed for a more fundamental shift in ethos: one where
honest investment in creativity is not treated like betting on a football game or investing in the
complex financial instruments that helped turn the securities market into a legal ‘pyramid scheme.’”).
265

The Future of Capital Formation, COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM,
http://oversight.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1277%3A5-10-11qthe-future-of-capital-formationq&catid=12&Itemid=20 (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
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Shapiro Letter, supra note 12, at 1.
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capital by companies and protecting investors in our rules and orders
is a critical goal of the SEC.267
After explaining the need for various securities laws and noting the instances where
the Commission had relaxed rules, Shapiro promised that the SEC staff would
“review the impact of our regulations on capital formation for small businesses,”
including a focus on “the regulatory questions posed by new capital raising
strategies.”268
Despite Chairman Shapiro’s promise to have SEC staff review the impact
and questions involving crowdfunding, her letter to Congressman Issa seemed to
indicate how the Commission might approach a crowdfunding exemption.269
Shapiro referenced the SEC’s Rule 504 double take, where it removed most barriers,
only to put them back after a rise in “pump and dump” fraud:270
The Commission's rules previously included an exemption (Rule 504)
that allowed a public offering to investors (including non-accredited
investors) for securities offerings of up to $1 million, with no
prescribed disclosures and no limitations on resales of the securities
sold. These offerings were subject only to state blue sky regulation
and the anti-fraud and other civil liability provisions of the federal
securities laws. In light of investor protection concerns about fraud
in the market in connection with conduct pursuant to this exemption,
the exemption was significantly revised in 1999.271
In considering a potential crowdfunding exemption, Shapiro said that “it will
be important to consider this experience and build in investor protections to avoid
the issues created under the prior exemption.”272 While “the limits on both
individual investment and offering amounts contemplated by crowdfunding may
reduce the incentives for abuse,” Shapiro noted that “the widespread use of the
internet for these types of funding strategies may present additional challenges to
267

Id.
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Id. at 24.
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See supra p. 96 and accompanying notes.
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investor protection as compared to those that were present when Rule 504 was
revised.”273 In other words, the Kassan petition, which eliminates disclosure and
anti-fraud elements in exchange for reduced losses to investors, is a non-starter.
Instead, Shapiro seems to describe in her comments the Commission’s likely
approach, which will not sacrifice rigorous investor protection mechanisms in
exchange for increased capital formation.274
Although indicating what could be described as a “once bitten, twice shy”
attitude, Shapiro explained that the Commission was not opposed to new small
issuer exemptions. In particular, she explained that in 1996, the Commission
adopted Regulation CE (“Reg CE”) to “assist small businesses in California to raise
capital” via a “coordinated federal and state exemption . . . for sales of securities of
up to $5 million to a qualified purchaser, which is defined to be less restrictive than
an accredited investor under Regulation D.”275 It is hard to imagine the relevance of
Reg CE to the crowdfunding issue because Reg CE only excuses the issuer from the
federal registration requirements, leaving state requirements intact, which would be
untenable for most crowdfunding operations.276 If Reg CE is the type of exemption
that the SEC would consider for a crowdfunding exemption, many crowdfunders
will likely be disappointed.
Any prediction about SEC action on this issue is premature. Even so, it is
important to understand the realistic probability of action and the realistic limits of
such action. The fact that the SEC has historically ignored small issuer concerns
certainly decreases the probability that the Commission will commit significant
resources to drafting permanent rules for a quickly changing area of innovation.277
Ultimately, the fastest way to get a crowdfunding exemption likely would be to pass
new legislation.
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CONCLUSION

In the last several years, crowdfunding has dramatically increased the ability
of artists, entrepreneurs, and nonprofits to find capital for a variety of projects.
Many promoters have embraced this type of fund raising because alternate forms of
capital financing are difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. While pure patronage
crowdfunding has filled a void by allowing promoters to raise several thousand
dollars at a time, many promoters find this insufficient.278 Investment crowdfunding
is the next logical step, filling the void between patronage crowdfunding and
traditional brick-and-mortar financing.279
However, current U.S. securities laws materially limit investment
crowdfunding. For instance, current state and federal regulation make investment
crowdfunding infeasible for most investment crowdfunding promoters and
intermediaries. The reality is that the upfront legal and accounting costs associated
with navigating the regulatory waters are too onerous for most investment
crowdfunding promoters.280
Because the current securities regulatory regime does not adequately allow for
investment crowdfunding, there has been a petition for SEC rulemaking that
includes a proposal for a new exemption. If enacted, this proposal would make
investment crowdfunding easy and accessible. However, the proposal is too
ambitious and probably has little chance of being adopted by the SEC. Yet, this
Article explores some ways to correct the principal deficiencies of the current
proposal for rulemaking. Ultimately, though, it is up to the SEC or Congress to clear
a path for an important new source of grassroots financing. Because small
businesses are the lifeblood of the nation’s economy,281 this Article recommends
careful reforms that would make it easier for small businesses to raise money
through investment crowdfunding, while still maintaining robust investor protection.
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